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Despite their vivid heterogeneity, the articles in this issue of the Journal nonetheless
share some common threads. Prominent among these is a search for transitional just-
ice moments or, phrased less elegantly, happenings.
Two of the articles unpack situations where transitional justice happened but was
not labelled or characterized as such. Four articles examine situations where transi-
tional justice did not happen, or only partly happened, or happened badly. And one
article identifies odious violence – child sexual abuse in the Roman Catholic Church
– which it argues should be addressed through a transitional justice paradigm.
The articles in this collection accordingly constellate around binaries and con-
tinua: hiding, eliding and the hidden; discovery and naming; claiming, disclaiming
and reclamation; regretting and ruing; and inclusion for the excluded. The articles
unravel Archimedean spirals. Some make a case for greater standardization and best
practices, while others gesture towards the pitfalls of proceduralization and the devel-
opment of those very same best practices. In the end, readers are left with refresh-
ingly competing prescriptions and a kaleidoscope of ideas.
Bits and pieces of each article map onto curatorial concerns that relate to mani-
curing transitional justice as a discipline, not to mention the rituals of labelling and
classing. Perhaps this hunger to categorize stems from the sprawling nature of the
discipline’s preoccupations. And perhaps this interest is all the more aching because
of transitional justice’s unresolved epistemology. From where do we know what we
know about transitional justice? What to observe? Do we even know where to look
to determine whether a moment was transitional? Or whether that moment was at
all just, or could have been rendered more just? It is to these questions that the art-
icles provide lively insights.
Human rights are admittedly abstract but remain deeply personal. Often, how-
ever, it is easier for transitional justice to grapple with abstracted rights than it is to
come to terms with actual human beings with all our indecision, nuance, resilience
and unpredictability. A transitional justice brimming with abstractions and guidelines
but that condescends flesh-and-blood beings quickly becomes ineffective and
dehumanized. The vacillations of the human condition may well exasperate and con-
found, but they may also surprise and please. They may demonstrate growth and re-
veal great beauty. Senegalese writer Mariama Bâ, in So Long a Letter, recounts how
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Ramatoulaye responds to news of her adolescent daughter’s concealed pregnancy.
Ramatoulaye learns of the news from Farmata, the griot of the cowries. After con-
fronting her anguished and ashamed daughter – holding her at once ‘painfully’ and
‘tightly’ – Ramatoulaye writes to Aissatou, her life-long confidante and daughter’s
namesake:
And also, one is a mother in order to understand the inexplicable . . . One is a
mother so as to face the flood . . . Farmata was astonished. She expected wailing: I
smiled. She wanted strong reprisals: I consoled. She wished for threats: I forgave.1
H I D D E N H A P P E N I N G S : P R E C U R S I V E O R U N S P O K E N
T R A N S I T I O N A L J U S T I C E
In his chapter, Marcos Zunino revisits the 1967 Russell Vietnam War Crimes
Tribunal, which assessed the responsibility of the US for genocide in Vietnam. For
Zunino, the Russell Tribunal represents an ‘early instance of transitional justice.’ He
thereby connects the Tribunal to the genealogy of transitional justice. Insofar as the
Tribunal operated decades before ‘the discourse of transitional justice emerged,’ it
was a transitional justice practice ‘avant la lettre.’ The Tribunal therefore represents
precursive transitional justice. Lessons from this ancestor, however, are not to be
applied only to contemporary ventures, however categorized, but rather generally to-
wards the discipline of transitional justice, regardless of what is classed as falling
within its genus.
The Tribunal was staffed by leading intellectuals, notably Bertrand Russell and
Jean-Paul Sartre. It emerged from outside the domain of states or international or-
ganizations. Zunino reclaims the value of this Tribunal, which most observers have
dismissed or ignored. He views the Tribunal as a historical antecedent for critical
approaches to transitional justice and as a ‘model of an alternative accountability
mechanism.’ Although not duly explored in the article, a particularly apposite mod-
ern analogue to the Russell Tribunal is the Women’s International War Crimes
Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery. The latter Tribunal met in 2000 and
released its final statement in 2001. It considered state and individual responsibility
for rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity, arising out of Japanese mili-
tary activity in the Asia Pacific region in the 1930s and 1940s. Its proceedings were
conducted formally in front of an audience. Like the Russell Tribunal, it too emerged
from civil society. It was proud of its origins – more so than the Russell Tribunal –
noting that law is an instrument of civil society and does not belong exclusively to
states or governments. Among its principal narrative contributions was a shift in ter-
minology. The Tribunal eschewed ‘comfort’ – a discomfiting euphemism – and in-
stead, as noted by Rumi Sakamoto, routinely deployed concrete terms such as
‘survivors,’ ‘victims,’ ‘torture,’ ‘rape,’ ‘trafficking’ and ‘sexual slavery.’2
1 Mariama Bâ, So Long a Letter, trans. Modupé Bodé-Thomas (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2012), 87.
2 Rumi Sakamoto, ‘The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery: A
Legal and Feminist Approach to the “Comfort Women” Issue,’ New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 3(1)
(2001): 49–58.











Zunino teases out several of the Russell Tribunal’s traits as having enlivened its
transitional justice journey. Prominent among these is the Tribunal’s focus on state
responsibility, which arose serendipitously insofar as Sweden, where the Tribunal
was based, forbade acts that insulted foreign heads of state. The Tribunal was thus
precluded from examining President Lyndon Johnson’s individual criminal responsi-
bility. Still, the Tribunal deployed the vernacular of penal process: charges, evidence,
rules and verdict (albeit unenforceable). Zunino also deracinates the Russell
Tribunal’s subversive side. He posits that it desecrated law’s sanctity while appropri-
ating its forms. Zunino lauds the Tribunal’s rootedness in the initiative of private in-
dividuals – civil society, so to speak – interested in commissioning the truth while
atrocities were still ongoing. The Tribunal therefore instructs on the value of punc-
turing state-centrism. Zunino also examines how the Tribunal deployed a broad
understanding of the crime of genocide, including cultural genocide, and chastised
the transnational economic order. This observation suggests that the push to legal
codification in treaties may come with its own set of opportunity costs. In cases of
genocide – and, now, the crime of aggression – codification in treaty law may narrow
the scope of the impugned conduct. Other accountability mechanisms less tethered
to individual criminal responsibility – such as the recently concluded work of the
Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission – engage broader understandings
of genocide, including, in the Canadian case, cultural genocide inflicted upon
Aboriginal populations.
Christalla Yakinthou and Sky Croeser look at modernity rather than ancestry, in
particular, the modernity of technology. They consider how transitional justice may
happen under our eyes though we may not see it as such. We may simply miss it be-
cause it takes the form of technology that is too fast, or too novel, for us to notice.
Yakinthou and Croeser’s subject matter is Internet reform in Tunisia, presented as a
form of institutional lustration. While the Internet served as a tool of repression in
Tunisia’s autocratic periods, it served as a site of resistance and democratic engage-
ment in the country’s transitional periods and beyond. In Tunisia, then, the role of
the Internet remains a form of unspoken transitional justice: not so much hidden,
since it happened in a blur and was known to happen, but never identified or cast as
such despite – unlike the case with the Russell Tribunal – the existence of a thick
concept of transitional justice and an avid interest in Tunisia as a national case study
thereof. For Yakinthou and Croeser, the lack of institutionalization of Internet re-
form is not necessarily problematic. On the contrary, they emphasize the flexible and
responsive ways in which local institutions and stakeholders approach transitions,
including memorialization, trust building and promoting social and occupational di-
versity. Still, the authors chide transitional justice’s ‘failure to even glancingly address
Internet reform,’ which they chalk up to the field’s ‘rigidity’ and seek to remedy
through an enhancement of the field’s attentiveness.
As with Zunino’s work, Yakinthou and Croeser invoke the Tunisian example of
unspoken transitional justice not just as a lesson in itself, but as pedagogy for the
field as a whole. To be sure, their research uncorks only one aspect of the relation-
ship between transitional justice and technology. Other interfaces hungry for sus-
tained attention include the meaning of reconciliation and community in virtual as
opposed to territorial spaces; the relationship between privacy rights/informational











dignity and rights to know/information sharing online (i.e., blogging or leaking infor-
mation about suspected human rights abusers); the circularity among structures that
oppress and liberate; and, finally, the extent to which virtuality democratizes transi-
tional justice by carving out spaces for private actors and stakeholders in document-
ing history while perhaps essentializing narratives of suffering and repentance.
O M I S S I O N S , P A R T I A L H A P P E N I N G S A N D B A D M O M E N T S
Lauren Dempster examines how and why disappearances carried out by Republican
armed groups in Northern Ireland elude transitional justice scrutiny. She notes how
the Republican insistence that the disappeared were legitimate targets left the move-
ment open to criticism that it was insufficiently abandoning or denouncing violence.
In a sense, then, we are left with a transitional justice omission, which Dempster ex-
poses and then – invoking Erving Goffman – places within the broader nexus of
frame analysis. She also links this omission to another neglected interaction – that
between armed movements and transitional justice. This neglect may be particularly
glaring when armed movements subsequently become engaged in postconflict pol-
itics, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s involvement in peace
processes and legislative composition.3 Dempster notes how actors may have ‘spe-
cific, complex and perhaps contradictory motivations’ in how they frame issues. In
the case of Republican disappearances, this triggers a ‘dissonance between actions
and rhetoric.’ That said, these framing choices do not necessarily impede transitional
processes. Rather, they may well mediate the ‘difficulties in keeping former combat-
ants on side while transitioning away from violence.’ Curiously, perhaps, the absence
of transitional expectations, notably best practices of who should be involved on
which specific terms, might accord invested parties greater latitude in generating
framing narratives in which contradictions are not seen as pejorative, but might in-
stead be appreciated as complements.
Victor Peskin and Mieczyslaw Boduszynski unfurl the vacillating role of the inter-
national community in terms of supporting the International Criminal Court’s
(ICC’s) judicial intervention in Libya. Initially, the international community’s pro-
ICC enthusiasm and support were high. The gusto soon faded, however, as did the
support. Peskin and Boduszynski link these oscillations to the undermining of the ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy of the ICC as a transitional justice institution in Libya. For
these authors, external actors become surrogate enforcers. Attitudinal volatility
among these enforcers leads the authors to eschew language such as justice ‘cascades’
and instead to prefer the metaphor of justice ‘tides’ that capture the waxing and wan-
ing of global justice norms. The fickle nature of the external commitment may gener-
ate the transitional justice institution but then subject it to caprice. The fickleness
then turns what would otherwise be a virtue into a foible. In the specific case of the
ICC in Libya, Peskin and Boduszynski are clear: external instrumentalization can
3 Similar questions arise with regard to the political involvement of persons convicted by international crim-
inal tribunals following their sentence or release. For example, Moinina Fofana’s early release was deemed
violated in March 2016. Fofana was a Civil Defence Forces leader in Sierra Leone. In revoking his early re-
lease and rearresting him, the president of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone noted that Fofana
was not free to participate in any political activity until May 2018 (the point at which his total sentence of
15 years would expire).











both boost and wither institutional effectiveness and thereby ‘plant the seeds for tri-
bunal delegitimation.’ Peskin and Boduszynski fear the acceleration of
an already established diplomatic precedent in which individual state parties
and the international community at large mobilize ICC intervention only to
sideline the Court when the pursuit of criminal accountability is perceived to
interfere with a range of foreign policy goals.
The growing strength of this precedent, according to these authors, places the
norm of international criminal accountability under ‘increasing strain.’ These
dependencies and variabilities, therefore, become undesirable.
Whereas Peskin and Boduszynski, and also Dempster, focus on omissions that
lead to partial happenings, Jasna Dragovic-Soso examines the omission in toto of a
truth and reconciliation commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). While a truth
and reconciliation commission was supposed to happen in BiH, it flatly did not –
just like it never happened in Rwanda either. Yet truth and reconciliation commis-
sions emerged in many other places, at times iconically, and the contrast between
these many spaces and the two places that generated the ad hoc international tribu-
nals remains evident. As to BiH specifically, Dragovic-Soso begins by mapping out
several initiatives between 1997 and 2006 to create a national truth and reconcili-
ation commission. She notes that external actors pushed for these initiatives.
Ultimately, Dragovic-Soso links the foundering of these proposals to three dynamics:
political resistance; institutional rivalry with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and the lack of legitimacy that BiH victim associ-
ations accorded to the initiatives. Bosniaks in particular feared ‘compromise’ truths
that may have generated symmetry between their vast suffering (83% of missing and
killed civilians in conflict) and the suffering of others. Dragovic-Soso locates peda-
gogic value in this transitional justice omission. She counsels that exogenous pres-
sures to promote transitional justice may become fulsome. If so, then these pressures
will not bear fruit in places with limited domestic political will and high levels of so-
cial mistrust in truth-seeking ventures. The role of the ICTY as a competing exter-
nally driven rival is particularly galling. In addition to compromising the prospects
for a truth and reconciliation commission, the ICTY’s push to convict some defend-
ants led it to welcome redacted evidence. That, in turn, undermined the
International Court of Justice’s ability to deliver transitional justice for the region
from proceeding to a truly transparent evidentiary record when it made its own as-
sessment of Serbia’s state responsibility for genocide in BiH. The ICTY did not wel-
come other modalities of justice. Rather, it stifled them. Transitional justice, then,
may be distorted by petty institutional politics.
Sarah Williams and Emma Palmer bring us to a bad moment or, more precisely, to
the avoidance of an even worse moment. The moment involves the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’s (ECCC’s) opportunity to address gender
equity through reparations. The paradox of reparative theory is that it assumes a return
to what was before. But what if the prior position – the ‘before’ – was marred by in-
equity and disadvantage for women and girls? The opportunity to repair then achieves
nothing more than the reassembly of the unfair: to regress, in other words. Williams











and Palmer assess the ability of the reparations mandate of the ECCC to transform
gender relations instead of reinforcing preexisting patriarchy. They conclude that plac-
ing this expectation on the ECCC leads to disappointment, perhaps inexorably, be-
cause of the ECCC’s structure, in particular its temporal jurisdiction, remedial
limitations, hunger for causality, jurisprudential caution and dependence on voluntary
funding and governmental cooperation. The authors broadly conclude that it may be
‘unrealistic or inappropriate’ for the ICC to attempt to provide transformative justice.
Their goal, then, is to avoid bad moments. One way to avoid these is to manage ex-
pectations, temper hopes and deflate altitudinous aspirations. Yet another way, osten-
sibly, would be to do less in the way of transitional justice institution building and
perhaps consider how goals of gender equality can be realized outside of transitional
justice frames. On the one hand, perhaps transitional justice can become transforma-
tive justice. On the other hand, perhaps transformative justice should simply remain
something else – separate and self-contained. The solution might not always be to
cram additional tasks onto the shoulders of an extant postconflict legal institution. The
solution might not be to say that transitional justice can do more, and then even more,
in an endless conjunctive and additive carnival. The solution may instead be to say that
transitional justice has its limits. And that the value of a transformative policy does not
depend on its underlying, or purported, transitionality.
T R A N S I T I O N A L J U S T I C E S T I L L N E E D S T O H A P P E N H E R E
James Gallen argues that transitional justice should operate as an ‘analytical frame-
work’ for responding to the legacy of child sexual abuse within the Roman Catholic
Church. Unlike many of the other contributors to this issue, Gallen sees potential in
applying transitional justice methods and mechanisms. He propounds an expansion
of the field into what may be a ‘novel’ context – one that is unrelated to armed con-
flict or authoritarianism. He argues by analogy, demonstrating how the violence of
child sexual abuse bears important parallels with subject matter traditionally accepted
as falling within transitional justice’s docket. Gallen points to the patterns of abuse,
the depth of superior responsibility and the subterfuge of transferring alleged perpet-
rators from one jurisdiction (parish, diocese) to another. In some instances, however,
the case he makes could be made even easier. For example, the institutionalization,
bureaucratization and normalization of violence that distinguish mass atrocity from
other forms of violence are all factors that arise within the church, itself a tightly con-
trolled hierarchical and authoritarian entity.
Gallen might more greatly emphasize the state-like nature of the church.
Certainly, the Holy See – the seat of the bishops of Rome, headed by the pope and
representing well over one billion Catholics worldwide – is not formally a state.
That said, as Cedric Ryngaert concludes, it is ‘a sui generis non-State international
legal person.’4 It has enjoyed this personality for centuries. The Holy See is a party
to many international treaties. It sends and receives diplomatic representatives to
4 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘The Legal Status of the Holy See,’ Goettingen Journal of International Law 3(3) (2011):
830 (noting also that the Holy See derives its personality from its spiritual sovereignty as the centre of the
Catholic Church).











and from many states. It has been granted sovereign immunity.5 It has permanent
observer status at the UN, and influenced the adoption of a UN declaration banning
all forms of human cloning. In the Rome Statute negotiations, it challenged the inclu-
sion of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity. The Holy See, moreover, links
to the Vatican, which unequivocally is a formal state. Sited on a 110-acre enclave in
Rome, the Vatican attaches to the Holy See through the 1929 Lateran Treaties with
the Kingdom of Italy (represented at the time by Benito Mussolini). According to
Ryngaert, the Vatican ‘has a status aparte in international law,’ existing as a ‘territorial
basis guaranteeing the independence of . . . the Holy See.’6 The Vatican also is party
to certain international agreements, which tend to be more technical in nature and
connected to its operational needs.
Gallen’s call is for more transitional justice, a better transitional justice, and for
the development of transitional justice best practices to facilitate both quality and
quantity. To be sure, the emergence of organizations, journals like this one, reports
and a UN special rapporteurship each contribute to the habitus. In contrast,
Yakinthou and Croeser, writing from the Tunisian vantage point, are less sanguine
about the benefits of officialization and more concerned with the limitations of insti-
tutionalized cultural capital and competence. They emphasize instead the potential
of the unplanned, organic and unprocessed.
Gallen notes how a victims’ group unsuccessfully petitioned the ICC’s Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP) to investigate Vatican officials on the basis of superior respon-
sibility for having consciously disregarded information that subordinates were com-
mitting or were about to commit sexual violence. The OTP declined the petition for
reasons related to lack of jurisdiction and temporality. That said, the petition indi-
cates the thirst among victims for justice, and the channelling of that impulse in the
case of some victims towards the ICC. For Gallen, transitional justice offers the
chance to ‘enable a comprehensive and coherent assessment of the issues involved
in responding to a past legacy of violence.’ The sum, therefore, becomes larger
than the parts. The collectivization of the victims relates a more powerful story than
fragmented cross-border accretion of a range of micro- or meso-level settlements, ad-
missions, reparations or sanctions under canon law. Gallen emphasizes the best prac-
tice that reparations for gross human rights violations need to come with an
acknowledgement of responsibility. Such acknowledgements have often been lacking
thus far in church settlements for child sexual abuse. Gallen appears comfortable
with the ‘expansionary trend’ in which transitional justice becomes applied to ‘non-
paradigmatic issues.’ Gallen is mindful yet also minded to see the potential not in a
borderless transitional justice, but in one whose borders are fluid and elastic.
C O N C L U S I O N
The diversity among the articles reveals the vivacity of transitional justice studies and
the breadth of the subject matter that now falls under the aegis of transitional justice.
5 For discussion related to the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, including exceptions thereto, see, ibid.
The persistence of the sovereign immunity question in lawsuits related to sexual abuse provides a further
justification for application of a much broader transitional justice paradigm.
6 Ibid., 858.











This diversity at the same time belies the fuzziness about what exactly transitional
justice should concern itself with and unmasks the field’s catch-all nature. We may
study anything and everything, which may lead to learning nothing. The catch-all na-
ture of what constitutes transitional justice is all the more exposed insofar as it is
advanced by influential actors, including the UN, as an integral part of postconflict
and peacebuilding strategies. Relatedly, we may see transitional justice in unexpected
places and lament its omission from expected places. That or this should have been
done as part of a transition – leading to a push towards professionalized homogen-
eity and the triumph of the checklist, manual and boilerplate. Once something novel
is identified as transitionally just, then it too enters the lexicon and morphs from in-
novative to precedential. More perplexing still is that best practices may shift transi-
tional justice into the exigent realm of only being capable of being done by those
with the available expertise. This shift may in turn prompt a drift to graft transitional
justice onto the very governmentality that abandons the vulnerable and engorges the
privileged.
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